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Abstract
The authors study a general-equilibrium economy in which agents have the ability to invest in a
risky technology. The investment risk cannot be fully insured with optimal contracts, because
shocks are private information. The authors show that the presence of these risks may lead to an
underaccumulation of capital relative to an economy where idiosyncratic shocks can be fully
insured. They also show that, although the availability of state-contingent (optimal) contracts
cannot provide full insurance, it brings the aggregate stock of capital close to the complete
markets level. Institutional reforms that make the use of these contracts possible have important
welfare consequences.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, E21, G0
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Financial institutions; Financial markets
Résumé
Dans une perspective d’équilibre général, les auteurs étudient une économie où les agents sont en
mesure d’investir dans une technologie risquée, mais où le risque d’investissement ne peut être
entièrement couvert par des contrats optimaux, car les chocs y constituent une information privée.
Les auteurs montrent que la présence de tels risques peut provoquer une sous-accumulation du
capital par rapport à ce que l’on observe dans une économie où il est possible de se prémunir
entièrement contre les chocs idiosyncrasiques. Ils montrent également que, bien que l’existence
de contrats (optimaux) modulés selon l’état de la nature ne procure pas une assurance totale, elle
amène le stock global de capital à s’établir à un niveau voisin de celui que l’on obtient dans une
économie dotée de marchés complets. Les réformes institutionnelles qui rendent possible l’emploi
de ce type de contrat ont une incidence considérable sur le bien-être.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D31, E21, G0
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Institutions ﬁnancières; Marchés ﬁnanciers1 Introduction
A large body of literature that studies saving behaviour in the presence of
uninsurable idiosyncratic risks assumes that these risks are not associated
with investment. As in Bewley (1986), the most common assumption is
that earnings or endowments are subject to shocks that cannot be insured
away (e.g., Aiyagari 1994, 1995; Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu 1992; Huggett
1993, 1996; ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu 1989; R´ ıos-Rull 1994). In this class of models,
the inability to fully insure idiosyncratic risk implies that the equilibrium
interest rate is lower than in a complete markets economy, whether market
incompleteness is taken as given or modelled endogenously. Because the
interest rate is equal to the marginal productivity of capital, the presence
of uninsurable risks implies that the stock of capital is larger than in the
complete markets economy (overaccumulation). Aiyagari (1995) shows that
in this case a positive capital income tax is desirable in the long run. Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003) show that a positive capital income tax
can improve the allocation when market incompleteness is endogenous, but
the mechanism that justiﬁes the positive tax is diﬀerent.
Although earnings or labour income uncertainty is an important source
of idiosyncratic risk, investment activities are also subject to uninsurable
risks. For instance, entrepreneurs invest heavily in their own business1 and
managers of corporations hold a large number of their ﬁrm’s shares.2 Even
the return from investing in education is highly uncertain and cannot be
insured away. Unlike with earnings or endowment risks, however, an agent
can avoid investment risks by choosing safer allocations of savings. Earnings
or endowment risks in the class of Bewley’s economies are beyond the control
of the agent. The agent can use only the available markets to (incompletely)
insure them.
In this paper, we model investment risks in three environments. In the
ﬁrst environment, the “Optimal Contract Economy,” agents can sign optimal
state-contingent contracts. These contracts, however, cannot provide full
insurance, because there are agency problems in the form of asymmetric
information. In the second environment, the “Bond Economy,” agents cannot
sign state-contingent contracts. Only non-contingent contracts (borrowing
and lending) are available. In the third environment, the “Complete Markets
1See Cagetti and DeNardi (2002), Carroll (2002), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Hurst
and Lusardi (2002), and Quadrini (1999).
2See Mikkelson, Partch, and (Shah 1997) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2000).
1Economy,” there are no agency problems, and therefore full insurance against
investment risks is possible.
By comparing these three economies, we show that:
(i) In the two economies with incomplete markets (the Bond Economy and
the Optimal Contract Economy), the equilibrium risk-free interest rate
is smaller than in the Complete Markets Economy. For certain speciﬁ-
cations of the model, however, the aggregate stock of capital is smaller
than in the Complete Markets Economy (i.e., there is underaccumula-
tion).
(ii) Even with very large agency problems, the availability of optimal con-
tracts brings the aggregate stock of capital and the equilibrium interest
rate very close to the corresponding levels in the Complete Markets
Economy. Also, the feasibility of optimal contracts increases welfare
signiﬁcantly.
The ﬁrst result, the underaccumulation of capital, may bring into ques-
tion our conclusion about the desirability of long-term capital taxes. Because
in Aiyagari (1995) the optimality of capital taxes derives from the overac-
cumulation of capital, if the model does not generate overaccumulation, the
rationale for the taxation of capital may also vanish.3
The second result highlights the importance of factors that make state-
contingent contracts feasible. Among these factors, formal and informal
institutions play a central role. State-contingent contracts are not used
extensively, because the enforcement system may be highly ineﬃcient and
costly. For instance, the resolution of contractual disputes may be extremely
long and uncertain. Cross-country studies show that the degree of contract
enforcement is correlated with the degree of ﬁnancial development; Levine
(1997) and Dolar and Meh (2002) review the empirical literature. In this
study, we interpret the economy with state-contingent contracts as an econ-
omy in which ﬁnancial markets are more developed, in part as a result of
the higher eﬃciency of the institutional enforcement. Our study therefore
provides a welfare assessment of institutional reforms (for example, legal sys-
tems) that lead to greater contract enforceability.
The model studied in this paper has some similarities with the model
studied in Khan and Ravikumar (2001), but there are two important dif-
ferences. First, their model allows for endogenous growth. Consequently,
3The full investigation of this conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper.
2agency problems aﬀect the long-term growth of the economy. In our model,
agency problems have only level eﬀects, since there is no endogenous growth.
Second, Khan and Ravikumar compare only the Optimal Contracts Econ-
omy with the Complete Markets Economy. In our paper, we are primarily
interested in comparing the Optimal Contract Economy with the economy in
which state-contingent contracts are not available (the Bond Economy), to
determine the welfare implications of institutional reforms that make possible
the availability of state-contingent contracts.
Our paper shares some similarities with a paper by Angeletos (2003),
in which he shows that uninsurable investment risks may induce underac-
cumulation of capital. In his paper, however, market incompleteness is not
endogenous, and it therefore does not identify whether the availability of
state-contingent contracts has large welfare implications in the presence of
agency problems. Our analysis is more general, because we show that the
underaccumulation result requires speciﬁc assumptions about the model (see
section 4).
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
model and characterize the problems solved by agents when state-contingent
contracts are available (Optimal Contract Economy) and when they are not
available (Bond Economy). Section 3 conducts the quantitative analysis
using parameterized versions of the model. Section 4 considers several ex-
tensions. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We consider a heterogeneous agent’s model where there is a continuum of











where ct is consumption at time t and β is the intertemporal discount fac-
tor. Households are endowed with one unit of time per period, supplied
inelastically at the market wage rate, wt.
Each household can run a risky technology that returns F(kt,l t+1,z t+1)
in the next period with the inputs of capital, kt, and labour, lt+1.T h e
variable zt+1 is an idiosyncratic independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
3shock that is unknown when kt is chosen, but it is known when lt+1 is cho-
sen. For simplicity, we assume that the shock can take only two values,
denoted by zL and zH,w i t hzL <z H. The probability, denoted by p(z), is
strictly positive for both realizations of the shock. The function F is strictly
concave in the production inputs and satisﬁes limkt→0 EFk(kt,l t+1,z t+1)=
limlt→0 EFl(kt,l t+1,z t+1)=∞.
The agent has the ability to divert the retained capital to get a private
beneﬁt. Diversion of capital is not observable and generates eﬃciency losses
in the form of a lower probability of the good shock, zH. We assume that
the probability of the good shock becomes zero in the case of diversion. The
private and unobservable return from diversion is additive to consumption.
Given ct, the agent’s consumption, the current utility is U(ct + αkt), where
α is a utility parameter that is constant in the model. When we later specify
the functional form for F(kt,l t+1,z t+1), we will impose some restrictions on
the parameter α that guarantee the ineﬃciency of diversion. Because of
the asymmetric information, the agent’s problem in the next section will be
subject to an incentive-compatibility constraint.
For the analysis that follows, it is convenient to deﬁne the gross revenue
net of the labour cost:
R(wt+1;kt,l t+1,z t+1)=F(kt,l t+1,z t+1) − wt+1lt+1. (2)
Given the speciﬁcation of the return from diversion, the optimal input of
labour is fully determined by the input of capital, the shock, and the wage
rate: lt+1 = l(kt,w t+1,z t+1). We can eliminate lt+1 as an explicit argument
of the gross revenue and write it simply as R(wt+1;kt,z t+1).
In addition to the risky investment, there are state-contingent assets that
pay b(zt+1) units of output in the next period conditional on the realization
of zt+1. The current value of these assets is δt

zt+1 p(zt+1)b(zt+1), where
δt =1 /(1 + rt) is the market discount rate and rt is the equilibrium riskless
interest rate.
2.1 The agent’s problem
We use a to denote the agent’s wealth or net worth before consumption.
Given the sequence of prices, P t ≡{ rj,w j+1}∞
j=t, the optimization problem
can be written as follows:


















Vt+1(a(zi))p(zi) ≥ U(c + αk)+βVt+1(a(zL)), (6)
a(zi) ≥ at+1. (7)
This is the optimization problem for any deterministic sequence of prices,
not only for steady states. The time subscript, t, in the value function is
motivated by the non-stationarity of the problem. Note that zi,w i t hi ∈
{L,H}, denotes the next-period realization of the shock, which is unknown
when the agent chooses the consumption and investment plan. Equation (4)
is the budget constraint. Equation (5) is the law of motion for the next-period
net worth before consumption, the variable a. Equation (6) is the incentive-
compatibility constraint and equation (7) imposes limited liability, which is
justiﬁed by the assumption that the agent can renegotiate any liability that
has a net worth smaller than a minimum value, at+1. The size of this lower
bound depends on the assumptions about the penalty that can be imposed
on a defaulting agent. Two assumptions that can be made are as follows:
• No market exclusion: It can be assumed that there is no market
exclusion if the contract is renegotiated and the investor can conﬁscate
only the current net worth of the agent. This can be justiﬁed using
an argument similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In this case, the
lower bound is at+1 = 0. A variation would assume that labour income
cannot be conﬁscated. In this case, the lower bound is at+1 = wt+1.
• Exclusion from the investment: It can be assumed that, as an
extreme form of punishment, the agent is precluded from running the
risky technology and a fraction, φ, of their current and future (labour)
income is conﬁscated in every period. The lifetime utility after repu-
diation is V t+1 =
∞
j=0 βjU((1 − φ)wt+1). The lower bound is then
determined by the condition Vt+1(at+1)=V t+1.
5Throughout the paper, we will adopt the ﬁrst assumption and we impose
at+1 =0 .
The structure of problem (3) is not standard, because the unknown value
functions, Vj,f o rj = t,t+1,..., enter the constraints of the problem and there
are no guarantees that it is concave. We will describe in the next section how
we deal with these analytical problems. For the moment, we assume that
a solution exists. This solution consists of the sequence of policy functions
{cj(a),k j(a),b j(a)(zi)}∞
j=t. Given the solution to the agent’s problem and the
initial distribution of households over asset a—which we denote by Mt(a)—
the general equilibrium can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Given the initial distribution, Mt(a), a general equilibrium is
deﬁned by (i) a sequence of prices, P t ≡{ rj,w j+1}∞
j=t; (ii) a sequence of
aggregate demands for labour, L(P t) ≡{ Lj+1(P t)}∞
j=t; (iii) a sequence of ag-
gregate capital, K(P t) ≡{ Kj(P t)}∞
j=t; and (iv) a sequence of aggregate con-
sumption, C(P t) ≡{ Cj(P t)}∞
j=t. These sequences must satisfy the following
requirements: (i) the aggregate demands for labour, capital, and consump-
tion must be the aggregation of individual demands, and they must satisfy
Lj+1(P t)=1and Cj(P t)+Kj(P t)=

aMj(da); and (ii) the distribution,
Mt(a), must evolve according to individual decisions and the stochastic prop-
erties of the shock.
2.2 Complete Markets and Bond Economies
We compare the allocation when state-contingent contracts are feasible with
the allocations in two alternative environments: when state-contingent con-
tracts are not available (Bond Economy) and when shocks are public infor-
mation (Complete Markets Economy).
The optimization problems solved in the Complete Markets Economy
and in the Bond Economy are special cases of problem (3). In the Com-
plete Markets Economy, the agent’s problem is not subject to the incentive-
compatibility constraint (6). This allows the agent to self-insure against the
investment risk, and the ﬁrst-order conditions imply that ERk(wt+1;kt,z t+1)=
1+rt,w h e r eRk is the derivative of the gross revenue with respect to k.O f
course, in the steady state it must be that 1 + rt =1 /β for all t.
6The optimization problem solved in the bond economy is also a special
case of problem (3). This is obtained by restricting b(zL)=b(zH)=b.I nt h i s












a = c + k + δtb, (9)
a(zi)=wt+1 + b + R(wt+1;k,zi), (10)
a(zi) ≥ 0. (11)
This is a standard concave problem, as formally stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 For any sequence of prices, there is a unique solution to
problem (8) and the function Vt(a) is strictly increasing, concave, and diﬀer-
entiable at all t.
Proof 1 It can be veriﬁed that the feasible set in problem (8) is convex and
the objective function is strictly concave. Therefore, if Vt+1 is concave, Vt
is strictly concave. Moving backward, we can establish that limt→−∞ Vt is
concave. Because the objective of problem (8) is strictly concave, the solution
is unique. Standard arguments can be used to prove that the value function
is diﬀerentiable. QED
Given proposition (1), the solution to problem (8) can be characterized
by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
U










 (ct+1) · Rk(wt+1;k,z)

+ λt,·Rk(wt+1;k,zL), (13)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the limited liability con-
straint (11). This is positive if the solution is binding.
The ﬁrst-order conditions make clear that the expected return from the
risky investment is always greater than the return from the risk-free asset;
7that is, 1+rt <E R k(wt+1;k,z;). To see this, consider the case in which the
solution is not binding. Conditions (12) and (13) imply that:
(1 + rt) · EU








Because U (ct+1) is negatively correlated with Rk(wt+1;k,z), the last term
on the right-hand side is negative, and, therefore, 1 + rt <E R k(wt+1;k,z).
We can compare this with the case in which zL = zH = z (no shocks).
In this case, the covariance term in equation (14) is zero and the marginal
returns from the two investments are equal; that is, 1+rt = ERk(wt+1;k,z).
In this case, the environment is similar to that described in Aiyagari (1995),
except that wt+1 is deterministic in our framework. Even if wt+1 is stochas-
tic at the individual level, however, the condition 1 + rt = ERk(wt+1;k,z)
still holds. Because the equilibrium interest rate, rt, is smaller than the in-
tertemporal discount rate, the model with only earnings risks generates an
overaccumulation of capital.
With investment risks, the result that the interest rate is lower than
the intertemporal discount rate still holds. The marginal return on capital,
however, is not necessarily smaller than the intertemporal discount rate, and
there could be an underaccumulation of capital. This result will be shown
numerically in section 3.
2.3 Optimal contract economy
One of the complications in solving problem (3) is that the unknown function,
Vt, enters the constraints of the problem. It is convenient to study the dual
problem, which minimizes the cost of providing a certain level of utility to
the agent.
We use vt to denote the lifetime utility of the agent and At(vt)t od e n o t e
the cost for the intermediary. This is deﬁned as:
8At(v)= m i n
c,k,v(zi)




















v(zi)p(zi) ≥ U(c + αk)+βv(zL), (17)
v(zi) ≥ vt+1, for i = L,H. (18)
Equation (16) is the promise-keeping constraint, equation (17) is the
incentive-compatibility constraint, and equation (18) imposes limited liabil-
ity. The lower bound, vt+1, is the equivalent of at+1 imposed in the original
problem.
This can be interpreted as the problem solved by a ﬁnancial intermediary
that enters into a long-term contractual relation with an agent. If we can
show that the long-term contract is equivalent to a sequence of short-term
contracts, we can claim that the solution of the dual problem is equivalent
to the solution of the original problem.
There are two main diﬃculties with the dual problem. The ﬁrst derives
from the fact that the constraint set is not convex. Consequently, we cannot
prove that the problem is concave and use ﬁrst-order conditions to char-
acterize the solution. Therefore, in solving the problem, we use a direct
optimization technique, described in the appendix.
The second diﬃculty is to show that the optimal long-term contract is free
from renegotiation and can be implemented with a sequence of short-term
contracts. As Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) show, if the utility
frontier is downward sloping, the long-term contract is free from renegotiation
and can be implemented with a sequence of short-term contracts. In our
model, the utility frontier is represented by the negative form of the function
At(v). Therefore, it is enough to show that −At(v) is not increasing for all v<
vt. In section 3, we will show this result numerically for the parameterizations
of the model considered in this paper.
Once we have (numerically) established that the solution of the dual prob-
lem (15) is equivalent to the solution of the original problem (3), we can easily
9see the correspondence between the two problems. The cost value, At(v), is
equal to the net worth, a, in the original problem. Likewise, the agent’s value,
Vt(a), in the original problem corresponds to the agent’s promised utility, v,
in the dual problem. Therefore, a = At(v)a n dv = Vt(a). In addition, the
lower bound, vt+1, is such that A(vt+1) = 0. This guarantees that the limited
liability constraint, a(zi) ≥ 0, is satisﬁed in the original problem.
3 Numerical Analysis
This section shows numerically the macroeconomic and welfare implications
of market incompleteness. Although it does not match speciﬁc observations,
it provides important information about the potential magnitude of these
implications.
Parameterization: We assign the following parameter values. The period
in the model is one year and the intertemporal discount rate is β =0 .95. The
risk-aversion parameter is σ =1 .5.
We assume that the shock aﬀects the eﬃciency units of capital. If the
investment at time t is kt, the eﬃciency units of capital at the beginning
of the next period (before choosing labour) are ˜ kt+1 = zt+1kt. The total
resources returned by the risky technology are:






The ﬁrst component is non-depreciated capital and the second is the output
produced. After setting zL =0 .5a n dzH =1 .0, the probability of the low
shock is chosen to have an expected depreciation rate of 8 per cent; that is,
p(zL)·zL +(1−p(zL))·zH =0 .92. This implies that, with 16 per cent prob-
ability, capital depreciates by 50 per cent, and with 84 per cent probability
there is no depreciation. A sensitivity analysis is conducted by changing the
value of zL (keeping the average depreciation rate constant). The return-to-
scale parameter is set to θ =0 .95 and the parameter   =0 .35. This implies
a labour income share of 60 per cent. We also set α =0 .2. This value guar-
antees that diversion is always ineﬃcient. We conduct a sensitivity analysis
with respect to this parameter. Table 1 reports the full set of parameter
values for the baseline economy.
10Table 1: Parameter Values for the Baseline Economy
Discount rate β 0.95
Risk aversion σ 1.50
θ 0.95
  0.35
Technology zk+[ ( zk) l1− ]θ zL 0.50
zH 1.00
pL 0.16
Diversion parameter α 0.20
Steady-state properties: Figure 1 plots several variables for an individ-
ual household in the steady-state equilibrium, for the Bond Economy (left
panels) and for the Optimal Contract Economy (right panels). The top pan-
els plot the household’s value as a function of assets; that is, the function
V (a). In the case of optimal contracts, this function is the inverse of the
function A(v) derived from solving the dual problem. Because V (a) is mono-
tonically increasing, the function A(v) is also increasing, which implies that
the utility frontier −A(v) is downward sloping. As Fudenberg, Holmstrom,
and Milgrom (1990) show, this guarantees that the long-term contract is free
from renegotiation and can be implemented as a sequence of short-term con-
tracts. Therefore, the solution of problem (15) is equivalent to the solution
of the original problem (3).
The other panels plot the investment in the risky technology, k,t h ei n v e s t -
ment in the state-contingent asset, b(z), and the next-period wealth, a(z). In
the Bond Economy, there are no state-contingent assets and b represents the
investment in the riskless asset, or bond. In both, the Bond and the Optimal
Contract Economies, the next-period wealth depends on the realization of the
shock. Note that state-contingent contracts reduce signiﬁcantly the volatil-
ity of assets, and, therefore, the risk of investing in the risky technology (see
the last two panels of Figure 1), which explains why the availability of these
contracts can have substantial macroeconomic and welfare consequences.
Table 2 reports the steady-state interest rate, aggregate capital, and con-
centration of wealth as measured by the Gini index. In the Complete Markets
Economy, the interest rate is equal to the intertemporal discount rate, and
the stock of capital (normalized to 1) satisﬁes ERk(w;k,z)=1 /β.I n t h e
11Figure 1: Value Function and Policy Rules in the Bond Economy and in the
Optimal Contract Economy
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two versions of market incompleteness, the interest rate is smaller than the
intertemporal discount rate. This is not surprising, given the results obtained
by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). What diﬀers here is that the aggre-
gate stock of capital is smaller than in the Complete Markets Economy. In
other words, market incompleteness may lead to underaccumulation of cap-
ital. This is the direct consequence of the fact that the accumulation of real
capital is risky and agents require a premium.
Table 2 also shows that the availability of state-contingent contracts
brings the steady-state level of capital very close to the complete markets
level. Note that the availability of state-contingent contracts reduces the in-
equality in the distribution of wealth, but only slightly. The Gini index for
wealth is small relative to the data, because shocks are i.i.d. and there is no
other source of heterogeneity. If we assume that only a subgroup of agents
12Table 2: Steady-State Interest Rate, Capital Stock, and Wealth Inequality
for Diﬀerent Degrees of Market Completeness
Interest Aggregate Gini
rate capital index
Bond Economy 4.22 0.911 43.8
Optimal Contract Economy 5.21 0.995 42.4
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 –
have access to the risky technology—as we do in section 4.1—the model
generates a much higher concentration of wealth. In the Complete Markets
Economy, the distribution of wealth is not determined. In other words, any
distribution of wealth is a steady-state equilibrium if in aggregate there is
the same (steady-state) level of capital; see Chatterjee (1994) for a proof of
this result.
Institutional reforms and welfare: The steady-state comparisons de-
scribed above show that market incompleteness may have substantial macroe-
conomic consequences in the absence of state-contingent contracts. Assuming
the existence of institutions that make the use of state-contingent contracts
feasible, what are the welfare consequences of introducing such institutions?
Figure 2 plots the transition dynamics for the interest rate, the wage rate,
the aggregate stock of capital, and the Gini index. After the introduction of
state-contingent contracts, the interest rate increases sharply and converges
gradually to the new steady-state level: the state-contingent contracts in-
crease the demand for capital immediately, while the supply responds only
gradually through capital accumulation. As panel (c) shows, the aggregate
stock of capital converges to a higher level, but only gradually. As capital
increases, the demand for labour increases and, to clear the labour market,
the wage rate must rise (panel (b)). The increase in the wage rate reduces
proﬁts and, therefore, the propensity to invest in the risky technology. This
eﬀect does not totally oﬀset the higher incentive created by the better insur-
ance possibilities that state-contingent contracts provide. Panel (d) shows
that the introduction of state-contingent contracts reduces the concentration
of wealth as measured by the Gini index.
The welfare consequences are calculated as the aggregate additional con-
13Figure 2: Transition to the Steady-State with State-Contingent Contracts
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sumption (appropriately distributed among agents) required to make all
agents indiﬀerent between remaining with the existing institutions (and being
unable to use state-contingent contracts) and undertaking a transition to the
new steady-state equilibrium after the introduction of the new institutions




t ) be the expected lifetime utility of an
agent who has a net worth of a and lives in the steady state of the Bond
Economy. The distribution of agents over a is denoted by M(a). Moreover,




t ) the expected lifetime utility of
an agent who has a net worth of a after the introduction of state-contingent
contracts (and, therefore, after undertaking the transition to the new steady
state). The consumption gain from transition for an agent who has a net
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Bond(a).
In other words, the consumption gain is determined by equalizing the life-
time utility reached in the transition with the lifetime utility obtained by
increasing the consumption in the Bond Economy by cBond
t g(a) for all t.











For the baseline parameterization, the average gains are 2.32 per cent of
aggregate consumption.
Although the average gains are positive, they are not uniformly dis-
tributed across agents. The top panel of Figure 3 plots the welfare gains
as a function of the initial wealth. The gains are larger for (initially) wealth-
ier agents. For example, an agent who has average wealth would gain less
than 2 per cent, and an agent who has 10 times the average wealth would
gain 12 per cent. The bottom panel plots the initial and ﬁnal distribution of
agents over assets, showing the relative importance of poorer agents (who do
not gain much from the transition) and wealthier agents (who are the largest
beneﬁciaries).
The distribution of the welfare gains can be explained as follows. After
the introduction of state-contingent contracts, the aggregate demand of cap-
ital increases. Because the supply responds slowly, the interest rate increases
(panel (a) of Figure 2). The increase in the interest rate is beneﬁcial for
the holders of wealth; that is, the richest agents. For the poorer agents, the
increase in the interest rate represents an increase in the cost of ﬁnancing,
because they are net borrowers. We may have expected the relaxation of
ﬁnancial constraints to be more beneﬁcial for poorer agents, because they
have tighter constraints. This would have been the case if the interest rate
had remained constant. Because of general-equilibrium eﬀects, however, the
interest rate does increase, and this beneﬁts those who receive interest pay-
ments: the rich.
Sensitivity analysis: We conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding the util-
ity parameter for diversion, α, the concavity of the production function, θ,
and the volatility of the shock, zH −zL. Table 3 reports key statistics for the
steady-state equilibrium and the welfare gains from the transition.
First, we observe that the higher utility from diversion does not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect our results. A similar conclusion seems to hold for the curvature
of the production function. The Gini index for the Bond Economy is smaller,
but the diﬀerence is not large. The volatility of the shock seems to play an
15Figure 3: Distribution of Welfare Gains Following the Introduction of State-
Contingent Contracts
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important role. The increase in volatility has signiﬁcant macroeconomic con-
sequences when state-contingent contracts are not available. For example,
the aggregate stock of capital drops by 8 per cent when the low realization of
the shock changes from 0.5 to 0.25. The drop in the risk-free interest rate is
also large. The availability of state-contingent contracts, however, still brings
the aggregate stock of capital very close to the complete markets level. As
a result, the introduction of state-contingent contracts leads to much larger
welfare gains, almost 5 per cent.
16Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady-State Values and Welfare Gains from
Transition
Interest Aggregate Gini Welfare
rate capital index gains
Baseline, α =0 .2, θ =0 .95, zL =0 .5
Bond Economy 4.22 0.911 43.8 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.21 0.995 42.4 2.32
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
Higher utility from diversion, α =0 .3
Bond Economy 4.22 0.911 43.8 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.18 0.992 41.1 2.19
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
Higher curvature of production, θ =0 .915
Bond Economy 4.19 0.911 38.8 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.21 0.994 41.7 2.25
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
Higher volatility of shocks, zL =0 .25
Bond Economy 2.96 0.832 48.3 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.23 0.997 42.1 4.73
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
4 Extensions of the Model
The model studied in the previous sections is very stylized. For example,
we have assumed that all agents in the economy have access to the risky
investment. It seems more reasonable to assume that only a subgroup of
households have access to this investment. We have also assumed that agents
do not face any earnings risks. Another assumption is that the labour supply
is ﬁxed, although in an actual economy it may respond to wages. Moreover,
we have assumed that the input of labour is chosen after the observation of
the shock. This section extends the previous model by considering alternative
assumptions.
174.1 Only a subgroup of the population have access to
the risky technology
One possible interpretation of the risky investment is that it captures the risk
associated with entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, we can assume that the
households that have access to this type of investment are the ones engaged
in entrepreneurial activities and/or high managerial positions. If we adopt
this interpretation, then about 10 per cent of households are in the position
of investing in the risky technology (see Quadrini 1999). We will refer to
these households as “entrepreneurs” and to the others as “workers.”
In this economy, entrepreneurs solve the same problem we studied ear-
lier. Workers solve a simpler problem: because they do not face a risk,
the consumption path can be easily determined using the Euler equation,
U (ct) ≤ β(1 + rt)U (ct+1), the budget constraint, at = ct + δtbt,a n dt h el a w
of motion for wealth, at+1 = wt+1 + bt. The Euler equation is satisﬁed with
the inequality sign if at+1 = 0; that is, if the borrowing limit is binding. In
the steady state, the interest rate is lower than the intertemporal discount
rate and the liability constraint will be binding: at =0f o ra l lt.T h el e v e l
of consumption is then equal to ct = δw,w h e r eδ and w are constant in a
steady state.
Table 4: Steady-State Values and Welfare Gains from Transition when
10 Per Cent of the Population Have Access to the Risky Investment
Interest Aggregate Gini Welfare
rate capital index gains
Bond Economy 1.84 0.873 95.1 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.24 0.993 94.9 5.81
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
The basic results do not change by assuming that only a subgroup of
the population have access to the risky investment (see Table 4). In par-
ticular, the aggregate stock of capital is still smaller than in the Complete
Markets Economy. Furthermore, the availability of optimal contracts brings
the aggregate stock of capital close to the complete markets level. The most
notable change is the increase in the Gini index, which occurs because only
a small subgroup of agents (the entrepreneurs) save. Although the model is
18stylized, this shows how entrepreneurial activities can generate a much larger
concentration of wealth. Also signiﬁcant is the increase in the welfare gains
from the introduction of state-contingent contracts. These larger gains come
from the increase in the wage rate. Because 90 per cent of the population
are workers who have a low level of consumption, the increase in the wage
rate, and therefore consumption, has an important impact on their utilities.
4.2 Agents also face earnings risks
Would the result change if agents also faced idiosyncratic risks to earnings,
as in the Bewley (1986) economy? To answer this question, we assume that
agents have diﬀerent earnings abilities, which we denote by ε. Individual
labour income is then the product of the earnings ability with the wage rate:
εw. Earnings abilities follow a two-state Markov process with a symmetric
transition probability, Γ(ε /ε).
To keep the problem simple, we assume that earnings abilities are observ-
able. This implies that, with optimal contracts, the earnings risk is insurable.
Therefore, the problem solved in the Optimal Contract Economy is the same
problem solved before. In the Bond Economy, the optimization problem is
also similar, except that we take expectations with respect to the earnings
ability, ε.
In Table 5, we report the results for the economy with earnings risks
where the process for earnings abilities has been calibrated by assuming an
autocorrelation of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.33. These are the baseline
numbers used in Aiyagari (1994).
Even with earnings risks, the aggregate stock of capital is smaller than in
the Complete Markets Economy. We observe, however, that the diﬀerence
between the two levels of capital is somewhat reduced. This occurs because
the presence of uninsurable earnings risks brings an extra incentive to save,
which reduces the equilibrium interest rate. The lower interest rate facilitates
more investment in the risky technology.
4.3 Elastic labour supply
In this section, we show how the results would change if labour was elastic.
We consider the extreme case in which labour is perfectly elastic. There
are two ways to incorporate this in the model. One possibility is to assume
that the utility function is of the form U(c − ϕ · l). Alternatively, we could
19Table 5: Steady-State Values and Welfare Gains from Transition when
Agents Face Earnings Risks
Interest Aggregate Gini Welfare
rate capital index gains
All agents have access to risky investment
Bond Economy 3.09 0.972 44.5 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.21 0.995 42.4 5.97
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
Only 10% have access to risky investment
Bond Economy 0.01 0.931 88.6 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.24 0.993 94.9 9.33
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
assume that wages are not set competitively and the wage rate is above the
market clearing rate with involuntary unemployment. For the calculation of
the welfare gains, we use the ﬁrst assumption.
Table 6 reports steady-state values for the economy with elastic labour.
As the table shows, market incompleteness has a much larger impact on the
macroeconomy when labour is elastic. In particular, the aggregate stock of
capital is substantially smaller (with and without state-contingent contracts)
than in the Complete Markets Economy. This is because, with inelastic
supply, the fall in the demand for labour induces a fall in the equilibrium
wage rate, which in turn increases the return from the risky investment (that
is, the expected proﬁt rate increases). This reduces the fall in the demand
for risky capital and, in equilibrium, the capital stock is higher. When the
supply is perfectly elastic, the lower demand for labour does not lead to lower
wages. Consequently, the fall in investment is bigger.
Figure 4 plots the transition path for several variables when labour is
elastic and when it is not elastic. The plots are constructed using the baseline
economy in which all agents have access to the risky investment. The cases
in which only a fraction of agents invest in this technology are qualitatively
similar (which we omit for reasons of space).
Of course, the assumption that labour is perfectly elastic is an abstrac-
tion. With a more reasonable assumption, in which the elasticity of labour
is positive but not inﬁnity, the eﬀects of market incompleteness on the accu-
20Table 6: Steady-State Values and Welfare Gains from Transition when
Labour is Elastic and All Agents Have Access to the Risky Technology
Interest Aggregate Gini Welfare
rate capital index gains
Bond Economy 4.57 0.650 42.5 –
Optimal Contract Economy 5.21 0.970 42.4 1.37
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 – –
mulation of capital are smaller. The point we would like to make, however,
is that the elasticity of labour tends to increase the underaccumulation of
capital when markets are incomplete.
4.4 The input of labour is chosen in advance
To this point, we have assumed that the input of labour is decided after shock
is experienced. Suppose that both capital and labour have to be decided on
one period in advance. To simplify the problem, we make some small changes
in the speciﬁcation of the technology. The total resources returned by the
risky technology are as follows:






The only relevant change to the technology is that the shock aﬀects output
alone, and therefore the depreciation of capital is not stochastic. We also
modify the beneﬁt from diversion as follows:
U(ct + αyt+1),
where yt+1 = Ezt+1(k 
tl
1− 
t )θ. With these changes, the capital-output ratio
chosen by the ﬁrm depends only on the wage and interest rates, and not on
the agent’s asset position. This facilitates the computation of the agent’s
problem (15).
Table 7 reports the steady-state results for the following parameter values:
α =1 .0, zL =0 ,a n dp(zL)=0 .5. The most important result is that the
aggregate stock of capital is higher than the complete markets level when
markets are incomplete (both in the Bond Economy and in the Optimal
21Figure 4: Transition to the Optimal Contract Economy for Diﬀerent Degrees
of Labour Elasticity
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Contracts Economy). Also note that the overaccumulation of capital is quite
large in the bond economy. The introduction of state-contingent contracts
brings it very close to the complete markets level.
The overaccumulation of capital can be explained as follows: Because
labour is chosen before the shock is experienced, the employment choice is
also risky. In other words, if the agent employs more labour, the return from
the risky investment is more volatile. This reduces the demand for labour
which, in turn, reduces the wage rate. Because of the lower wage rate, the ex-
pected proﬁt per unit of capital is higher. This provides an incentive to invest
more in the risky technology. As a result, market incompleteness generates
overaccumulation of capital, as in the model that has only earnings risks.
Note, however, that with only earnings risks the wage rate is higher than in
the Complete Markets Economy. Nonetheless, when markets are incomplete,
the wage rate is still lower than in the Complete Markets Economy.
22Table 7: Steady-State Values When Labour is Chosen in Advance and All
Agents Have Access to the Risky Technology
Interest Aggregate Gini
rate capital index
Bond Economy 1.70 1.201 63.5
Optimal Contract Economy 4.81 1.010 52.3
Complete Markets Economy 5.26 1.000 –
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have studied an economy in which agents have investment opportunities
in a risky technology. Our consideration of uninsurable investment risks may
overturn the assumption that uninsurable risks induce agents to overaccu-
mulate capital. We have shown that, with investment risks, the equilibrium
stock of capital may be smaller than in the Complete Markets Economy. This
may also change some earlier results that emphasize the beneﬁts of long-run
capital taxes. We have also shown, however, that the underaccumulation
of capital depends on the assumption that labour is chosen in advance and
there is no risk in the employment choice. When labour is chosen in advance,
more capital can overaccumulate in a model that has investment risks than
in a simpler model that has only earnings risks.
We have also compared economies with diﬀerent degrees of market in-
completeness, focusing on economies in which state-contingent contracts are
available but not able to provide full insurance because of information asym-
metries. Even if agency problems are quite severe, in the sense that agents
can obtain large gains by diverting resources, the use of state-contingent
contracts can lead to an aggregate stock of capital that is very close to the
one with complete markets, and substantially higher than the capital that
would prevail when state-contingent contracts are not available. We have
also shown that institutional reforms that make it feasible to use optimal
contracts can have important welfare consequences. The next step is to un-
derstand which types of institutional environments facilitate or make possible
the use of these contracts. That is left for future research.
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25Appendix: Computation of the Equilibrium
Steady state for the Bond Economy: We start by guessing the steady-
state interest and wage rates. Given the prices, we solve problem (8) on a
grid of points for the asset holdings, a, using value function iteration. After
guessing the next-period values of V (a) at each grid point, we approximate
this function with a quadratic polynomial. Given the next-period value func-
tion, problem (8) is solved at each grid point using a maximizing routine that
does not require a smooth value function. We use the Fortran routine BCPOL.
Once the iteration on the value function has converged, we use the agents’
policy rules to ﬁnd the invariant distribution of agents over a. Starting from
an initial distribution, we iterate until convergence. After aggregating using
the invariant distribution, we verify the clearing conditions in the capital
and labour markets, update the prices, and restart the procedure until all
markets (labour and capital) clear.
Steady state for the Optimal Contract Economy: The numerical
procedure is similar to the procedure used to solve for the steady state of
the Bond Economy based on value function iteration. Because we solve for
the dual problem (15), the agent’s problem is solved at each grid point of
v. In forming the grid for v, however, we do not know the lower bound v.
Therefore, when we guess the prices r and w, we also guess the value of v,
which is the ﬁrst point of the grid. After solving for the individual problem
on all grid points, we verify whether A(v) = 0. If it does not, we update the
guess for v until this condition is satisﬁed.
Transition equilibrium: To compute the transition from the steady state
of the Bond Economy to the steady state of the Optimal Contracts Economy,
we ﬁrst guess the sequences of prices, r and w, and lower bounds, v,f o ra
certain number of periods. The number of periods is suﬃciently long for the
economy to get close to the new steady-state equilibrium. Given the guessed
sequences, we solve the agent’s problem backward at each grid point, starting
from the ﬁnal transition period. In the ﬁnal period, the economy is supposed
to have converged to the new steady state; therefore, we already know the
solution. Once we have solved for all transition periods, we start from the
initial period and compute the market clearing conditions and the condition
At(vt) = 0. We then update the guessed sequences and continue until all the
equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed in all transition periods.
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